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Abstract
Much of the research on small group performance shows that groups tend to outperform individuals
in most task domains. However, there is also evidence that groups sometimes perform worse than
individuals, occasionally with severe negative consequences. Theoretical attempts to explain such
negative performance events have tended to point to characteristics of the group or the group process
that were different than those found for better performing groups. We argue that typical group
processes can be used to explain both good and bad group performance in many instances. Results
from a pair of experiments focusing on two different task domains are reported and used to support
our arguments.
Keywords
group performance
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Groups are a ubiquitous aspect of human existence (Brewer & Caporael, 2006). We are born and
raised in families, learn in classrooms, socialize in
friendship groups and communities, and often
work in teams. One of the reasons that work is
done in teams is that the resources available to
a team are superior to those harnessed by a single individual (Wegner, 1987). These additional
resources allow group performance to exceed that
of a single individual in most task domains (Davis,
1969; Larson, 2010). The vast amount of research
on group performance shows that groups,
although rarely performing at their full potential,
typically perform as well or better than individuals on most tasks (Hill, 1982; Hinsz, Tindale, &

Vollrath, 1997; Kerr & Tindale, 2004). Thus,
groups are used in many key aspects of both
public (e.g., parliaments, cabinets, juries, etc.) and
private (e.g., task forces, corporate boards, focus
groups, etc.) life.
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Groups do not always perform well, however.
There are many tasks where groups are inappropriate, or at least extremely inefficient (e.g., writing
a poem). And without appropriate resources, even
well designed teams may fail (Hackman, 1998).
But even well-resourced groups with knowledgeable members sometimes will make poor (even
disastrous) decisions (Janis, 1982). Incidents like
the space shuttles Challenger and Columbia explosions and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion are examples of poor group decisions. In each case, groups
of experts had made or supported the decisions
even though, allegedly, information was present
that should have led them to decide otherwise
(Nijstad, 2009). Such decisions are often blamed
on poor decision processes. Probably the most
well-known description of dysfunctional group
decision processes is Janis’ (1982) groupthink.
Based on a number of case studies, Janis defined
multiple aspects of groupthink including high
cohesiveness, directive leadership, poor information search, and sanctions against dissent.
Although there is now evidence that poor information search and sanctions against dissent can
impede group performance under some circumstances (see Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch,
Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007; Postmes, Spears, &
Cihangir, 2001), neither insures that groups will
do poorly. In addition, most evidence argues that
high cohesiveness and directive leadership often
aid group performance (Mullen & Copper, 1994;
Perterson, 1997). Thus, the research evidence to
date has not been particularly supportive of
groupthink either as a phenomenon or an explanation of poor group performance (Baron, 2005;
Kerr & Tindale, 2004).
Recent theorizing has begun to explore how
basic group processes can be used to explain both
good and poor group performance in different
contexts (Brodbeck et al., 2007; Kerr and Tindale,
2004; Tindale, Talbot, & Martinez, in press). In
the current paper, we argue that two rather basic
and quite common aspects of group consensus
processes can be used to explain many instances
of both good and poor group performance. Both
aspects can be seen as instances of what we
have referred to as “social sharedness” (Kameda,

Tindale, & Davis, 2003; Tindale & Kameda,
2000). Social sharedness is the idea that task-relevant cognitions (broadly defined) that the members of a group have in common, or share, exert
a greater influence on the group than do similar
cognitions that are not shared among the members. The cognitions that are shared can vary
from preferences for decision alternatives or
information about the alternatives to heuristic
information processing strategies that the members cannot even articulate. However, the greater
the degree of sharedness for a particular task relevant cognition, the greater the likelihood that it
will influence the group decision. In general, we
will argue that social sharedness is often adaptive
and probably evolved as a useful aspect of living
in groups (Kameda & Tindale, 2006; Kameda,
Wisdom, Toyokawa, Inukai, 2012). However,when
the shared cognition is inappropriate to the current situation, it can lead groups to make poor
decisions.
The current research focusses on two types or
levels of social sharedness: Shared preferences
and shared task representations (Tindale, Smith,
Steiner, Filkins, & Sheffey, 1996). Shared preferences refer to the degree to which members of a
group prefer a particular decision alternative.
Numerous studies have shown that the size of a
faction favoring a particular alternative is a good
predictor of the likelihood that the group will
choose that alternative, and that the largest faction defines the group consensus most of the
time (Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975;
Tindale, Davis, Vollrath, Nagao, & Hinsz, 1990).
Thus, a majority/plurality decision model (or
social decision scheme – SDS, Davis, 1973) does
relatively well in predicting group decision outcomes on a variety of tasks. Table 1 shows the
SDS representation (the social decision scheme
matrix, D; Davis, 1973) for a majority wins process for a six-person group. It also shows a proportionality SDS that represents the probability
of group decision outcomes as identical to the
proportion of members that initially favored the
alternative. A proportionality model provides a
good baseline for studies comparing individual
and group decision making since it predicts group
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Table 1. Social Decision Scheme Models for Majority
Wins–Otherwise Equiprobability and Proportionality
Individual
distributions

Group distributions
Majority Wins
– Equiprobability
Otherwise

Proportionality

A–B

A

B

A

B

6–0
5–1
4–2
3–3
2–4
1–5
0–6

1.00
1.00
1.00
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.00
1.00

1.00
0.87
0.67
0.50
0.33
0.13
0.00

0.00
.013
.033
0.50
0.67
0.87
1.00

Probability of Group Choice

1
0.9
0.8
0.7

Proporonality
Majority

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Probability of Individual Choice

Figure 1. The probability of the group choosing A
as a function of individual choice probabilities for
both Majority Wins–Otherwise Equiprobability and
Proportionality Social Decision Schemes.

and individual preference distributions to be
equivalent. As can be seen in the table, any time
four or more individual favor a given alternative
(A or B), a majority model predicts the group will
choose that alternative.
Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities of
the group choosing alternative A for both the
majority and the proportionality models as a
function of the probability that a randomly sampled individual from the population from which
group members would be drawn would choose
A. Given the proportionality model functions
as the individual choice baseline, the figure
shows that when individuals are likely to choose
A, a group employing a majority-wins process

exacerbates this tendency and is even more likely
to choose A. Under the assumption that A is the
correct or optimal alternative, majority-wins
groups should perform better than the average
individual anytime the individual choice probability for A is greater than .5. However, if individual
preference probabilities favor B, then majoritywins groups will choose A less often than individuals, thus performing more poorly.
The second aspect of social sharedness relevant to the current research involves what we
have called “shared task representations” (Tindale
et al., 1996). Tindale and colleagues defined a
shared task representation as “any task/situation
relevant concept, norm, perspective, or cognitive
process that is shared by most or all of the group
members (Tindale et al., 1996, p. 84). “Task/situation relevant” means that the representation
must have implications for the choice alternatives
involved, and the degree to which a shared representation affects group decision processes and
outcomes will vary as a function of its perceived
relevance. Its influence will also vary by the
degree to which it is shared among the group
members—the greater the degree of sharedness
(the more members who share it), the greater its
influence.
Probably the best example of shared task representation is the first component of Laughlin
and Ellis’ (1986) definition of a demonstrable
task—a task where group members can demonstrate during group discussion that a particular
alternative is “correct” or “optimal”. Laughlin
(1999) has argued that one of the reasons that
groups are better problem solvers than are individuals is that group members often share a conceptual system (i.e., a shared task representation)
that allows them to realize when a proposed solution is correct within that system. This shared
conceptual system, or background knowledge, is
what allows a minority member with a correct
answer to influence a larger incorrect faction to
change its preference to the correct alternative.
Such situations are well described by SDS models
called “truth wins” and “truth supported wins”
(Laughlin, 1980; see Table 2). Truth wins predicts
that any group that has at least one member with
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Table 2. Social Decision Scheme Models for Truth
Wins and Truth-Supported Wins
Individual
distributions

Group distributions
Truth-Supported
Wins

A–B

A

B

A

B

6–0
5–1
4–2
3–3
2–4
1–5
0–6

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00

Probability of Group Choice

Truth Wins

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Proporonality
Truth Wins
Truth Supported

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Probablity of Individual Choice

Figure 2. The probability of the group choosing the
correct alternative as a function of individual choice
probabilities for Truth Wins, Truth-Supported Wins
and Proportionality Social Decision Schemes.

the correct answer will be able to solve the problem correctly (Lorge & Solomon, 1955; Laughlin,
1980). Truth supported wins argues that at least
two members of the group must have the correct
answer in order for the group to solve the problem correctly (Laughlin, 1980). Figure 2 presents
the relationship between individual and sixperson group decision preferences (for alternative A which is assumed correct in the present
context) under both a truth wins and truthsupported wins SDS. In both cases, the group
probability of choosing the correct response
increases more rapidly than the probability of an
individual choosing the correct response. The
probability increase for groups under the truth
wins model is considerably steeper than the

increase for the truth supported wins model, but
both curves show that groups will virtually always
out-perform individuals when correct minority
faction can convince incorrect majority factions
to switch their preferences to the correct alternative. However, if one were to assume that the
shared task representation favored an incorrect,
rather than a correct, alternative (assume alternative A is incorrect), then Figure 2 would represent
an “error wins” process and groups would rarely
if ever outperform individuals.
Research has shown that shared task representations do not always favor normatively or objectively correct or optimal alternatives (Hinsz,
Tindale, & Nagao, 2008; Tindale, 1993). Using
problems where individuals tend to make intuitively appealing but incorrect judgments, groups
often show biases in the same intuitive but incorrect direction. Hinsz et al. (2008) asked individuals
and groups to respond to base rate neglect problems similar to the “cab problem” employed by
Tversky and Kahneman, 1980). In this problem, a
witness to a hit and run accident says the cab
involved was green, but there are only two colors
of cabs in the city and there are many more blue
cabs (85%) than green cabs (15%) on the road at
any given point in time. In a later test, the witness
is found to be 80% accurate in distinguishing
between blue and green cabs. With less than perfect witness accuracy, estimates that the cab was
actually green should be well below 80% yet many
individuals anchor their estimates at or near 80%.
Hinsz et al. found that groups were even less likely
than individuals to temper their estimates in the
direction of the base rate and were more likely to
simply choose 80%. Smith, Tindale, and Steiner
(1998) had individuals and five-person groups
make investment decisions for “sunk cost” problems (problems where people tend to continue
investing in a project that is failing because they
have already invested a large amount of money—
i.e., a “sunk cost”) and found that groups
were equally likely as individuals to choose to put
“good money after bad”. In addition, two-person
minorities favoring continued investment were
often persuasive against 3 person majorities
favoring the opposite when they used sunk cost
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arguments (e.g., “if we stop now all that money
went to waste”).
Much of research on good vs. poor group
performance has tended to argue that the different performance outcomes are a function of
inherently different processes (Brodbeck et al.,
2007; Janis, 1982). However, based on the work
on shared preferences and shared representations, it is quite possible that many instances of
poor performance are simply basic group processes working in a context where they lead the
group in a poor direction. The two poor performance situations of interest here would be those
where larger factions tended to be wrong and the
shared representation would favor the incorrect
alternative. In other words, the same basic processes that groups often use that lead to good
performance outcomes can lead to poor outcomes in certain contexts. The two studies we
report here both demonstrate this basic idea.
Groups making decisions using shared representations of the task and how it should be
approached, in conjunction with majority influence processes will lead to good outcomes when
the representations aid in reaching good decisions, but will lead to poor outcomes when they
do not. Both good and poor performance by
groups (i.e., better and worse than an individual
performance baseline) will be demonstrated using
two different task domains; syllogistic reasoning
and probability estimation.

Study 1
Study 1 is a follow up to a study comparing individual and group performance on syllogistic reasoning tasks across cultures where the premises
were consistent or inconsistent with different cultural beliefs (Smith et al., 2000). In the Smith et al.
study, individuals and groups worked on 8 syllogisms and were asked to judge whether the conclusion was valid or invalid. Half of the syllogisms
had valid conclusions and the other half had invalid conclusions, based on formal, propositional
logic. Generally, groups performed better than
individuals and Japanese students performed better than their American counterparts. However,

there was one syllogism where Japanese groups
performed substantially worse than individuals.
This anomaly led us look more closely at that particular syllogism and we found that it was the only
one we used that included the qualifier “some” in
one of the premises and in the conclusion (e.g.,
some A are B). In formal logic, saying “some A
are B” merely insures that the categories are not
mutually exclusive, but does not exclude other
possibilities (e.g., that “all A are B” or “All B are
A”). However, research has shown that people
often assume via conversational norms (Grice,
1975) that the inclusion of “some” in the statement implies more—e.g., that only some and not
all are included (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993).
In further analysing the group discussions, it
appeared that such misinterpretations of the formal logic definition of “some A are B” led groups
to perceive the syllogism’s conclusion as valid
when it was not.
Misconstruing how the term “some” should
be interpreted in formal logic should not always
impede performance on syllogism problems.
Syllogisms that use some in both a premise and
the conclusion can be valid, and would be seen as
valid even if “some” were misinterpreted. Thus,
misconstruing the implications of “some” may
actually aid in the correct evaluation of a syllogism under some circumstances. The current
study attempted to assess whether this shared
conversational norm would both aid and impair
groups’ abilities to correctly evaluate the validity
of different syllogisms.

Method
Participants Participants were 522 undergraduate introductory psychology students drawn
from two Midwestern universities. Students participated either as individuals (132) or as members of five-person groups. All participants were
given course credit for their participation.
Materials and procedures Upon arrival at the
lab, participants were randomly assigned to either
the individual or group condition. In both
conditions, participants first responded to eight
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syllogistic reasoning problems as individuals. All
eight problems included the qualifier “some” in
one of the premises and in the conclusion. Half
of the syllogism contained a valid conclusion that
logically follows from the premises, for example:
All protesters are healthy for the country.
Some radical leftists are protestors.
Therefore, some radical leftists are healthy for
the country.
Regardless of whether the interpretation of
the minor (second) premise implies “some are
not”, the conclusion is still valid. The other half
of the syllogisms included a conclusion that did
not logically follow from the premises, but
appeared valid under certain logically-erroneous
but conversationally-plausibe interpretations of
what “some” means. For example:
Some immoral people are scientists.
All scientists are atheists.
Therefore, some atheists are not immoral.
For these syllogisms, erroneously assuming
that “Some immoral people are scientists” implies
that the two categories “immoral” and “scientists”
overlap only partially (and, hence, that one could
further assume that “Some immoral people are
not scientists” or that “Some not immoral people
are scientists”) leads to the appearance that the
conclusion is valid. Half of the participants
received the syllogisms in a pre-specified random
order and the other half received them in the
reverse order. Participants responded to each syllogism’s conclusion using an eight-point scale
ranging from 1 (absolutely invalid) to 8 (absolutely
valid) with scale scores 3 and 4 labeled “perhaps
invalid” and 5 and 6 labeled ”perhaps valid”.
Participants in the group condition worked on
the eight syllogisms as a group and chose a score
between 1 and 8 for each syllogism. Groups were
told that they could reach their group decision in

any way that they liked but that the final group
response should reflect the groups’ collective
opinion. Participants in the individual condition
worked on an unrelated task during the times
while groups worked on the problems. Following
the group responses or the work on the unrelated
task, all participants again rated the eight syllogisms as individuals using the same response
scale. Participants were told that these responses
did not need to correspond to those they or their
group had made before, but should reflect their
current thinking on the problem. Following this
final round, all participants were debriefed,
thanked for their participation and excused from
the experiment.

Results
For the four valid syllogisms, higher ratings were
associated with better performance, while the
opposite was true for the four invalid syllogisms.
Thus, we reverse scored the invalid syllogisms so
that higher ratings always defined better performance. We then averaged the ratings for both
individuals and groups across the four syllogisms
of each type. We then performed a 2 (group vs.
2nd test individuals) by 2 (syllogism type: valid vs.
invalid) analysis of variance on the average scores.
The means associated with condition are presented in Figure 3. The results showed a significant main effect for the individual—group
difference, F(1, 208) = 10.73, p < .01, partial η2 =
.049, with groups (M = 4.86) performing better
that individuals (M = 4.57). A significant main
effect of syllogism type was also found, F(1, 208)
= 19.03, p < .001, partial η2 = .084, showing better
performance for valid (M = 5.01) than invalid (M
= 4.35) syllogisms. However, both main effects
were qualified by a significant individual-group by
type of syllogism interaction, F(1, 208) = 16.36,
p < .001, partial η2 = .073. As shown in Figure 3
and collaborated with simple effects analyses,
groups performed better than individuals for
valid syllogisms, F(1, 208) = 22.08, p < .001, partial η2 = .096, yet performed worse than individuals for invalid syllogisms, F(1, 208) = 6.46, p < .02,
partial η2 = .030.1
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6
5

Rang

4
3

Individual
Groups

2
1
0

Valid
Invalid
Type of Syllogism

Figure 3. Individual and group performance for
valid and invalid syllogisms
Table 3. Observed Social Decision Schemes for valid
and invalid syllogisms
Individual
distributions

Group distributions
Valid

Invalid

C–I

N

C

I

N

C

I

5–0
4–1
3–2
2–3
1–4
0–5

38
92
64
72
34
3

1.00
0.96
0.81
0.65
0.41
0.00

0.00
0.04
0.19
0.35
0.59
1.00

25
62
79
77
50
11

0.72
0.73
0.35
0.42
0.24
0.09

0.28
0.27
0.65
0.58
0.76
0.91

C = Correct Response; I = Incorrect Response; N = Number
of groups.

Two different approaches were used to assess
aspects of the group discussion and influence
processes. First, Table 3 shows the observed social
decision scheme matrices for both the valid and
invalid syllogisms. The initial preference distributions are based on group members’ initial reponses
scored as correct vs. incorrect as a function of
whether their judgments were on the “correct”
half of the scale (1–4 for invalid syllogisms and
5–8 for valid syllogisms). Evidence for both faction size/majority processes and the effects of
shared task representations are present. First,
there were a greater number of groups with
majorities favoring the correct response for the
valid (64%) as opposed to the invalid (55%) syllogisms. In addition, the correct majorities won

93% of the time for the valid syllogisms, but only
55% of the time for the invalid syllogisms. A key
comparison between the different types of syllogisms can be seen for the groups where a correct
three-person majority faced an incorrect two person minority. For the valid syllogism, the majority
prevailed 81% for the time, but for the invalid syllogisms, the majority won only 35% of the time,
χ2 (1, N = 143) = 33.55, p < .001, Φ = .48. Such
differences tend to imply that the incorrect
response was easier to defend for the invalid
syllogisms.
The group discussions were also videotaped
and coded for whether the groups discussed the
meaning of “some” in the context of the syllogisms (Cohen’s κ = .75).2 In all cases where some
was mentioned, it was resolved consistent with
conversational norms rather than formal logic
(i.e., they always agreed that some implies some
are not). For the valid syllogisms, when some was
discussed, it improved group performance (93%
correct) relative to when it was not discussed
(64%), χ2 (1, N = 42) = 3.94, p < .05, Φ = .31. For
invalid syllogisms, this trend was reversed, though
not significantly so, with groups that mentioned
some (14%) doing less well than group that did
not mention some (32%), χ2 (42) = 1.54, p > .05,
Φ = .19.
The results generally showed that within the
same problem domain, groups could perform
both better and worse than individuals depending
on whether their shared understanding of the
problems tended to help or hinder their performance. In both cases, larger factions tended to
win, but the larger factions were more likely to
favor the correct alternative for valid syllogisms
as compared to invalid syllogism. In addition,
two-person minorities favoring the incorrect
alternative were very unpersuasive for the valid
syllogism, but two-person minorities favoring the
incorrect alternative were quite persuasive for the
invalid syllogisms. Thus, both group performance
trends—above and below the individual baseline—can generally be explained by basic processes associated with shared preferences and
shared representations of the task.

Downloaded from gpi.sagepub.com at GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV LIB on May 20, 2013

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 15(5)

610		

Study 2
Study 2 is also an extension of earlier research
looking at group performance on tasks where
individuals tend to apply simple but potentially
inappropriate heuristics to probability estimation
problems (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The task
domain used involved estimating conjoint probabilities, using the classic “Linda the feminist bank
teller” problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
Kahneman and Tversky had participants read a
short description of Linda, which described her
as outgoing, athletic, extroverted, and liberal.
Then they asked participants to estimate the likelihood that Linda would fall into various categories. One of the questions asked participants to
the likelihood that Linda was a bank teller, which
tended to produce low estimates because it was
not consistent with the stereotype created by the
description. Another question asked for an estimate for Linda being a feminist, which led to relatively high judgments since it did fit the stereotype.
A third question asked participants to estimate
the likelihood that Linda was a “feminist bank
teller”. Since feminist bank teller is, by definition,
a subset of bank tellers, probability theory argues
that estimates for feminist bank teller should be
less than or equal to estimates for bank teller.
However, most people judged feminist bank
teller as more likely than simply bank teller
because it was a better “representation” of the
description of Linda provided. Yates and Carlson
(1986) found that people generally overestimate
conjunction probabilities when one of the component parts is considered fairly likely. When
both components are unlikely, the likelihood of
making a conjunction error (overestimating the
likelihood of the conjunction) is drastically
reduced. However, when both components are
quite likely, the error rate is increased.
Our initial work comparing individuals and
groups using problems modeled after the Linda
problem showed that groups were more likely
than individuals to make conjunction errors for
those types of conjunctions with high individual
error rates, but make fewer errors than individuals for conjunctions with low error rates (Tindale

et al., 1996). More recent research has shown that
individuals are less likely to overestimate conjunctions when they are familiar with the actual frequencies associated with the components of the
conjunction (Gigerenzer & Hofferage, 1996).
Thus, it is possible that groups might be less error
prone when making judgments about categories
that they have experience with or are knowledgeable about. We also had the ability to videotape
the group discussions in the current study which
we were not able to do in our previous research.

Method
Participants Participants were 470 undergraduate introductory psychology students drawn
from two Midwestern universities. Students participated either as individuals (122) or as members of four-person groups. All participants were
given course credit for their participation
Materials and Procedures Upon arrival at the
experiment, participants were randomly assigned
to participate as individuals or members of 4person groups. All participants then were then
asked to read a short paragraph about a fictitious
person and to make a series of likelihood judgments concerning that person as individuals.
Likelihood judgments were made on 100-point
scales where 0 = 0% likely and 100 = 100% likely.
The paragraph and estimates were modeled after
the “Linda” problem used by Tversky and
Kahneman (1983). Half of the participants
(those in the unfamiliar condition) received a paragraph describing a generic male person with no
particular relationship or relevance to the participants, much like Linda in the feminist bank teller
problem. The description of this person implied
introversion, intelligence, and high business and
mathematical abilities. The likelihood judgments
about the person used these traits to define the
likely and unlikely categories (e.g., social director
at his condominium—unlikely; good chess
player—likely). The other half of the participants
received a paragraph describing a male student at
the participants’ university (familiar condition).
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This person was described as a typical student at
the university and the likelihood judgments were
based on categories that most students would
know to be common or rare (e.g., from the Chicago area—likely; a math major—unlikely). Particpants made nine likelihood judgments, of
which three were used as the main dependent
variables. Participants made likelihood judgments
for 5 single categories, and also made estimates
for three conjunction categories; two likely categories, one likely and one unlikely category, and
two unlikely categories. Each of the component
parts of the conjunctions were included in the
five single category ratings. Thus we had participant ratings for each conjunction and their ratings for each of the component parts of the
conjunction.
Following the initial judgments, individual participants worked on an unrelated task, while
group participants were asked to make the nine
likelihood judgments again but this time as a
group. The groups were told that they could
make their judgments in any way that they liked
but the final group response should reflect the
group’s collective opinion. After the groups finished making their group judgments and the individuals finished the unrelated task, participants
again made individual likelihood judgments for
the nine questions. Following this last set of judgments, the participants were debriefed, thanked
for their participation, and excused from the
experiment.

Results
Individual and group likelihood judgments for
the three conjunctions were scored as correct or
incorrect by comparing the likelihood judgment
for the conjunction to the likelihood judgments
for the two components of the conjunction. The
judgment was scored “correct” if it was less than
or equal to the lower of the two component judgments. Otherwise, it was scored an error. The
final individual judgments and group judgments
were subjected to a 2 (individual vs. group) by 2
(familiar vs. unfamiliar case) x 3 (type of conjunction: likely–likely (LL), likely–unlikely (LU), and

unlikely–unlikely (UU)) repeated measures analysis of variance. The only effects that reached significance were the main effect for conjunction
type, F(2, 410) = 49.12, p < .001, partial η2 = .193;
the conjunction type by individual-group interaction, F(2, 410) = 17.96, p < .001, partial η2 = .081;
the conjunction type by familiarity interaction,
F(2, 410) = 6.17, p < .01, partial η2 = .029; and the
conjunction type by individual-group by familiarity interaction, F(2, 410) = 3.29, p < .05, partial η2
= .016. In order to futher explore the three-way
interaction, we ran three 2 (individual-group) x
2(familiarity) analyses of variance, one for each
conjunction type. It appears that the three-way
interaction stems mainly from the fact that there
is a nearly significant individual-group by familiarity interaction for the LU conjunction, F(1, 410) =
2.98, p < .09, partial η2 = .008, but not for the UU,
F(1, 410) = .084, p =.77, partial η2 < .001, or the
LL F(1, 410) = .51, p = .48, partial η2 = .001.
As shown in Figure 4, groups (88% correct)
generally performed better than individuals (72%
correct) for the UU conjunctions (panel a), F(1,
410) = 12.63, p < .001, partial η2=.034, but groups
(35% correct) performed worse than individuals
(51% correct) for the LL conjunctions (panel b),
F(1, 410) = 8.46, p < .01, partial η2 = .023. However,
for the LU conjunctions (panel c), groups performed better than individuals only in the familiar
condition (groups—80%; individual—59%),
F(1, 410) = 5.06, p < .05, partial η2 = .047, and
performed slightly worse (though not significantly so) than individuals in the unfamiliar
condition (groups—53%; individuals—59%),
F(1, 410) = .31, p = .58, partial η2 = .003. Thus,
familiarity only seemed to impact group judgments when the unlikely component was combined with a more likely component. Replicating
past research, when both components were likely,
groups exacerbated the error tendencies found at
the individual level, but, when both components
were unlikely, groups made fewer errors than
individuals.
We once again looked at the group decision
processes in two ways. First, as shown in Tables 4,
5, and 6, we calculated the observed social decision schemes for groups in both the familiar and
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Figure 4. Individual and group performance across familiarity conditions for (a) Unlikely–Unlikely,
(b) Likely–Likely, and (c) Likely–Unlikely conjunctions.
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Table 4. Observed Social Decision Scheme matrices
for both familiar and unfamiliar versions of the
Unlikely–Unlikely conjunctions
Individual
distributions

Group distributions
Familiar

Unfamiliar

C–I

N

C

I

N

C

I

4–0
3–1
2–2
1–3
0–4

12
13
13
4
1

0.92
0.92
0.85
0.75
0.00

0.08
0.08
0.15
0.25
1.00

15
15
10
2
0

1.00
1.00
0.70
1.00
–

0.00
0.00
0.30
0.00
–

C = Correct Response; I = Incorrect Response; N = Number
of groups.

Table 5. Observed Social Decision Scheme matrices
for both familiar and unfamiliar versions of the
Likely–Likely conjunctions
Individual Group distributions
distributions
Familiar
Unfamiliar
C–I

N

C

I

N

C

I

4–0
3–1
2–2
1–3
0–4

9
9
15
9
2

0.44
0.33
0.33
0.22
0.00

0568
0.67
0.67
0.78
1.00

0
6
5
17
15

–
0.33
0.40
0.24
0.20

–
0.67
0.60
0.76
0.80

C = Correct Response; I = Incorrect Response; N = Number
of groups.

Table 6. Observed Social Decision Scheme Matrices
for both familiar and unfamiliar versions of the
Likely–Unlikely conjunctions
Individual
distributions

Group distributions
Familiar

Unfamiliar

C–I

N

C

I

N

C

I

4–0
3–1
2–2
1–3
0–4

15
12
12
3
1

0.73
1.00
0.58
1.00
1.00

0.27
0.00
0.42
0.00
0.00

2
11
17
9
4

0.50
0.72
0.47
0.33
0.25

0.50
0.28
0.53
0.67
0.75

C = Correct Response; I = Incorrect Response; N = Number
of groups.

unfamiliar conditions for each type of conjunction (UU, LL, and LU respectively).3 For the UU
conjunctions (both familiar and unfamiliar, see
Table 4), there were many more correct than
incorrect majorities and correct minorities were
often able to win over incorrect minorities. For
the LLconjunctions in both familiarity conditions
(see Table 5), the patterns were reversed. Across
all observed member preference distributions,
groups were more likely than not to make an
error, and many more groups had majorities that
had made errors as individuals. However, for the
LU conjunctions (see Table 6), the patterns were
somewhat different for the familiar and unfamiliar conditions. For the unfamiliar condition, there
were approximately the same number of majorities favoring the correct and incorrect positions,
and there was a very slight tendency for incorrect
minorities to be more influential than correct
minorities. However, for the familiar conjunctions, there were many more groups with correct
majorities and correct minorities tended to win.
Thus, for the familiar LU conjunctions, both the
shared preferences and the shared knowledge of
the category frequencies tended to override the
general tendency toward the conjunction error.
We also videotaped the group discussions and
two independent coders coded them in terms of
how groups seemed to reach consensus (κ =
.69).4 Although five different categories emerged
from the coding, two of the categories encompassed 86% of the groups that could be coded;
group went with a single member’s response
(60%), and group chose a compromise or rough
combination of two members’ responses (26%).5
Table 7 shows the percentage of correct
responses for both familiar and unfamiliar conditions for each conjunction type for groups categorized into these two consensus process
categories. As can be seen in the table, these consensus processes led to fairly good performance
for the UU conjunctions regardless of familiarity.
These same processes led to fairly poor performance for both familiar and unfamiliar LL conjunctions. However, for the LU conjunctions, the
processes led to fairly good performance in the
familiar condition, but not for the unfamiliar
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Table 7. Proportion of correct group responses for groups using one of two main judgment strategies by type
of conjunction and familiarity
Type of conjunction

Decision maker

Familiar

Unfamiliar

Unlikely–Unlikely

Individual
Group
Individual
Group
Individual
Group

.61
.86
.41
.34
.59
.80

.70
.93
.39
.26
.59
.55

Likely–Likely
Likely–Unlikely

condition, although the differences between the
familiarty conditions were only marginally significant, χ2(1, N = 29) = 3.25, p < .10, Φ = .33. Thus,
seemingly the same processes led to considerably
different performance levels across the three
types of conjunctions, and for the LU conjunctions, led to performance differences as a function of familiarity.

General discussion
As previously noted, it is often assumed by both
the popular press and many groups researchers
that good vs. poor group performance varies as a
function of good vs. poor group processes (e.g.,
Janis, 1982). Although there is evidence that certain group process characteristics can lead to better
or worse performance (Brodbeck et al, 2007; De
Dreu, Nijstad, & von Kippenberg, 2008) our general argument is that most groups probably do not
display either particularly good or poor process,
but rather typically function under fairly basic
social processes, one of which we refer to as social
sharedness (Tindale & Kameda, 2000). Social sharedness tends to serve groups well in many common decision domains, as exemplified by the
finding that groups often outperform individuals
(Davis, 1969; Kerr & Tindale, 2011; Larson, 2010).
However, in situations where shared knowledge is
biased or inappropriate for a particular task, groups
will tend to share preferences that are incorrect or
suboptimal, yet in the group discussion, such preferences will seem plausible even to members who
did not favor them at the beginning of the discussion. In these situations, groups doing much of
what they normally do will not produce the

outcomes (superior performance) we typically
expect from groups.
The results of Study 1 showed that groups can
both perform well and poorly on syllogistic reasoning tasks depending on whether their normative assumptions interfere with the formal logic
underlying the problem. For those syllogisms
where the conversational norm “stating the qualifier some implies that the categories only partially
overlap” did not interfere with judging the syllogisms validity, groups did perform better than
individuals. However, for those syllogisms where
the norm did interfere, the groups performed
worse than individuals. Study 2 showed similar
performance patterns for judging the likelihood
of conjunctive events. In those situations where
the members’ basic tendencies led to lower judgments (e.g., when both components were unlikely)
groups performed better than individuals.
However, when those basic tendencies led to
high judgments (e.g., when both component
likely), groups performed more poorly than individuals. Extending our previous research in this
area, we also found that using categories with
which the group members were familiar allowed
groups, to a greater degree than individuals, to
avoid conjunction errors when conjoining a likely
and an unlikely category. It could be that the
direct knowledge of the size of an unlikely category makes it easier to construe the conjunction
more appropriately and to make lower judgments
seem more plausible. This greater plausibility may
also affect how confident a particular member is
in terms of his/her initial estimate, which could
increase the speed and intensity of how the estimate is presented to the group.
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Even when we looked at group processes at a
more fine grained level, we found that both good
and poor performance could be produced by similar processes. For the syllogism problems, discussing the meaning or implications of premises
and conclusions that contained the qualifier
“some” always led to the resolution that some
implies some are not. This extra scrutiny may have
implied that the groups were attempting to use
logic to solve the problems. When the resolution
did not interfere with the logic of the problem,
the discussion appeared to improve performance.
However, when the resolution did interfere, it led
to poorer performance. For the conjunction task,
two dominant consensus processes emerged:
choose one members preference or merge preferences from two members. These processes were
equally likely across all conditions, yet led to good
performance for the UU conjunctions and poor
performance for the LL conjunctions. In essence,
many of our groups in both studies were doing
the same things, but those things were beneficial
in some cases and not beneficial in others.
There are two possible conclusions one could
take away from the research described here that
would be incorrect.6 First, just because some of
our groups performed rather poorly should not
be used to argue that using groups to make
important decisions is bad. The vast majority of
research on group decision making and problem
solving argues exactly the opposite: groups very
often perform better, and rarely perform worse,
than the level of performance one would expect
by a single individual (Larson, 2010). All our
results show is that groups can make mistakes
even when they are acting in ways that typically
lead to good performance. In other words, groups
do not have to fall prey to poor decision practices
in order to perform poorly. Second, it would also
be erroneous to assume that groups cannot be
taught to perform in more optimal ways. Groups,
on their own, will often perform well, but group
training to insure good communication, trust,
and an accurate shared model of the task and the
relevance of the various member roles can produce substantial performance increments
(Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993;

Weiner, Kanki, & Helmreich, 1993). And training groups to watch out for task specific errors
can be used to help groups adapt to environments where their typical responses are not
effective (Paulus, Nakui, Putman, & Brown, 2006;
Semmer, Tschan, Hunziker, & Marsch, 2011).
Thus, although groups will typically do well, they
can do better. We hope the studies presented
here help to focus attention away from overgeneralizations from past work (e.g., Janis, 1982)
and to help to better isolate what factors truly are
important for group performance.
Notes
The research reported here was funded by the following grants from the National Science Foundation (SBR
#9730822, SES #0136332, BCS #0621632, & BCS
#0820344). Potions of this article were drawn from
the Midwestern Psychological Association’s Presidential Address (2008) by the first author. The authors represent four generations of James Davis’ professional
progeny as each later author began their careers as a
student of the preceding author and the first author
was a student of Jim’s
1	An analysis using the sum of the number of correct responses (any rating of 5 or greater for valid
syllogisms and 4 or less for invalid syllogisms)
produced the identical interaction and simple
effects results.
2	Due to technical issues, particularly poor sound
quality, only 42 of the groups produced discussions that could be reliably coded.
The numbers of groups per row within each
3	
matrix in each condition were relatively small, so
we did not attempt statistical comparisons between
conditions.
4	Once again, technical difficulties limited to 41
the number of group discussions that could be
reliably coded. Since each group estimated likelihoods for three conjunctions, we had 122
cases (one group could not be coded for the LU
conjunction) .
5	The other three categories were: Averaged the two
component scores of the conjunction (6%), correctly insured that the conjunction estimate was
below both components (7%), and multiplied the
two component estimates together (< 1%).
Because of their low numbers and because each
of these strategies, by definition, leads either to a
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correct response or an error, we did not include
them in the reported analyses.
6	We bring these up here because they are conclusions that have been inferred by audience members when we have presented these results at
conferences.
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